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Abstract
It is commonly thought that the distinction between subjectively valid
judgements of perception and objectively valid judgements of experience
in the Prolegomena is not consistent with the account of judgement Kant
offers in the B Deduction, according to which a judgement is ‘nothing
other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of
apperception’. Contrary to this view, I argue that the Prolegomena
distinction maps closely onto that drawn between the mathematical and
dynamical principles in the System of Principles: Kant’s account of the
Prolegomena distinction strongly suggests that it is the Analogies of
Experience that make it possible for judgements of perception to give rise
to judgements of experience. This means that judgements of perception are
objectively valid with regard to the quantity and quality of objects, and
subjectively valid with regard to the relation they posit between objects.
If that is the case, then the notion of a judgement of perception is consistent
with the B Deduction account of judgement.
Keywords: perception, experience, judgement, objectivity, appear-
ance, judgement of perception, judgement of experience, System of
Principles, Prolegomena
1. Introduction
In the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, written between the
publication of the ﬁrst and second editions of the Critique of Pure
Reason (CPR), Kant draws a distinction between two types of empirical
judgements: judgements of perception and judgements of experience.
The former are only subjectively valid: ‘they hold only for us, i.e., for our
subject’, while the latter have objective validity: we ‘intend that they
should be valid at all times for us and for everyone else’. Judgements
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of perception ‘do not require the pure concepts of the understanding,
but only the logical connection of perceptions’, while judgements of
experience require ‘in addition special concepts originally generated in
the understanding’ (§18, 4: 298).1
The Prolegomena distinction is not mentioned in either edition of the
CPR. In the BDeduction, Kant draws a distinction between the subjective
associations of imagination on the one hand, and the objective unity of
apperception, which attaches to all judgements, on the other (§19, B142).
This has led some commentators to conclude that the B Deduction
abandons the distinction drawn in the Prolegomena in favour of a more
uniﬁed account of judgements, in which they are all objectively valid.
Paul Guyer argues that the distinction between judgements of perception
and judgements of experience is inherently at odds with the CPR
assumption that any form of apperception presupposes the categories
(Guyer 1987: 101). In the ﬁrst edition of his Kant’s Transcendental
Idealism, Henry Allison argues that the Prolegomena distinction is
replaced in the CPR by the distinction between subjective and objective
unities of consciousness (Allison 1983: 148–53). Altering his position in
the book’s revised and enlarged edition, Allison aligns himself with Ernst
Cassirer, who argued that Kant’s notion of a judgement of perception ‘is
only meant to be a methodologically constructed limiting-case’, to provide
a contrast to the notion of scientiﬁc objectivity (Allison 2004: 179–82;
Cassirer 1953: 245–6). Norman Kemp Smith also argued that the
distinction is ‘thoroughly misleading’, and fundamentally at odds with
Kant’s fully developed critical system (Smith 1918: 288–9).
In this paper I aim to salvage the much-maligned Prolegomena
distinction. I will argue that, with help from the System of Principles, the
Prolegomena distinction can, indeed, be reconciled with the B Deduction
account of judgement. To that end, I will begin with an overview of
Kant’s treatment of the notion of objectivity, which is central to the
distinction between perception and experience in his system (section 2).
I will go on to look at the System of Principles in the CPR, arguing that
the mathematical principles (Axioms of Intuition and Anticipations of
Perception) involve the generation of perception from empirical intuition,
while the Analogies of Experience involve the generation of experience
from perception (section 3). I will then look at Kant’s account of
the distinction between judgements of perception and judgements of
experience in the Prolegomena, and argue that his account of the
distinction strongly suggests that the ‘special concepts’ required for
making judgements of experience are those belonging to the relational
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categories (section 4). Finally, I will show that the framework I have
developed allows us to circumvent the most common problem faced in
reconciling the Prolegomena distinction with the account of judgement in
the B Deduction (section 5).
2. Overview: Objectivity and Determinacy
In Kant’s critical system, ‘representation’ is the umbrella term used for all
mental states. Under ‘representation’ fall sensations, intuitions, concepts,
cognitions and even judgements. Human intuitions are either pure or
empirical. Pure intuition is the mere form of space and time, and
empirical intuition is the spatiotemporal form ‘ﬁlled in’ with sensory
matter. Concepts, which belong to the faculty of understanding, can
also be pure or empirical. If pure, concepts are called categories.2 The
categories are characterized as general rules of synthesis (B105), where
synthesis is to be understood, in the most basic terms, as the process of
combining and ordering complex representations into a uniﬁed whole.
Together, space, time and the categories are the pure forms under which
every object that can come before us must necessarily stand.
Intuitions, concepts and judgements are each characterized as ‘objectively
valid’ at some point in the CPR.3 If one is to make sense of this seemingly
indiscriminate usage, it has to be allowed that Kantian objectivity
admits of gradations. In the lectures on logic transcribed by Jäsche, Kant
characterizes the ‘objective content’ of cognitions in precisely these terms:
degrees. Here, he distinguishes between various levels of cognition,
allowing that it is only by means of concepts that we can ‘understand’
(verstehen) something (9: 64–5).4
In delineating these gradations of objectivity, I will draw on Kant’s notion
of determination (Bestimmung) in the transcendental sense (i.e. in the sense
having to do with the mind’s a priori contribution to cognition).5 Kant
talks about transcendental determination in the Amphiboly section of the
CPR, where he characterizes form as ‘determination’ and matter as ‘the
determinable in general’ (A266/B322).6 In rough terms, then, to determine
something in the transcendental sense is to impose a priori form on its
matter. Again, according to Kant there are of course a number of a priori
forms of experience: space, time and the categories. It must be the case,
then, that determinacy (i.e. ‘enformedness’), also admits of gradations.7
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, appearance is introduced as ‘the
undetermined object of an empirical intuition’ (B34/A20). There is,
however, a more general sense in which ‘appearance’ is used in the
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transcendental idealist framework: even when the (originally indetermi-
nate) object of empirical intuition is determinate, it is still ‘only’ an
appearance in contrast to things in themselves. This fully determinate
object of representation (i.e. appearance in the second sense) is a
‘phenomenon’.8 At the most basic level, the object of a sensible intuition
is indeterminate (or ‘determinable’) with regard to pure concepts of the
understanding.9 As the categories are ‘concepts of an object in general’,
subsumption under the categories is necessary for the further determi-
nation of objects and their relations (B148, A137/B176). As representa-
tions are synthesized, their objects go from being appearances (in the ﬁrst
sense) to being phenomena.10 What is a composite of matter and form
at one level of representation (intuition) can serve as matter at a higher
level of representation (experience).
Now we can return to the discrete gradations of objectivity. As with the
formal determinacy of objects, so with the objectivity of representations:
the more formally determinate an object, the more objective its
representation. The objectivity of a representation is, in other words, an
indication of the extent to which its object is determined with regard to
the a priori forms of experience.11 A fully objective representation
would be an experience or empirical cognition. An entirely subjective
representation, on the other hand, would be a sensation:12 sensations
are ‘immediate’ representations, meaning they are unprocessed by
our cognitive apparatus (i.e. they are pure matter and formless).13 As
the forms of experience are the a priori conditions of cognition for all
discursive spatiotemporal intellects, objective validity can be understood,
in the most general sense, as formal inter-subjective validity.
So far, we have established the following preliminary levels of objectivity
and determination shown in the table.
It should be clear that this purely formal notion of objectivity is a
necessary but not sufﬁcient condition of the empirical truth of cognitions,
if by empirical truth we understand the agreement not only of the form
Level of
Objective
Validity Representation Form Matter Object
Level of
Determination
1 Intuition Space and time Sensation Appearance 1
2 Experience The categories Intuition Phenomena 2
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but also of the content of cognition with the object to which it is related
(A59–60). Objective validity is thus a negative criterion of empirical
truth, and objectively valid empirical judgements are those that are
capable of being true for everyone.
3. A Priori Principles
Kant characterizes the a priori principles of the understanding as
‘principles of the objective determination of all representations’ (B142)
and ‘rules of the objective use of the categories’ (B201). The categories are
divided into two groups: the mathematical categories (quantity and
quality) pertain to objects of intuition; the dynamical categories (relation
and modality) concern the existence of the objects of intuition, ‘in
relation to each other or to the understanding’ (B110). The a priori
principles of the understanding, likewise, fall into two groups: the
mathematical principles (Axioms of Intuition and Anticipations of
Perception) and the dynamical principles (Analogies of Experience and
Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General).14
In a note added to the second edition of the System of Principles, Kant
elaborates on the nature of the syntheses corresponding to these two
kinds of principles:
All combination (conjunctio) is either composition (compositio)
or connection (nexus). The former is the synthesis of a manifold
of what does not necessarily belong to each other, as e.g., the two
triangles into which a square is divided by the diagonal do not of
themselves necessarily belong to each other, and of such a sort is
the synthesis of the homogeneous in everything that can be
considered mathematically (which synthesis can be further
divided into that of aggregation and of coalition, of which the
ﬁrst is directed to extensive magnitudes and the second to
intensive magnitudes). The second combination (nexus) is the
synthesis of that which is manifold insofar as they necessarily
belong to one another, as e.g. an accident belongs to some
substance, or the effect to the cause – thus also as represented as
unhomogeneous but yet as combined a priori, which combina-
tion, since it is not arbitrary, I call dynamical, since it concerns
the combination of the existence of the manifold (which
can again be divided into the physical combination of the
appearances with one another and the metaphysical, their
combination in the a priori faculty of cognition). (B201–2)
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The syntheses carried out in accordance with the ﬁrst two categories thus
compose the extensive and intensive magnitude of appearances (hence
the mathematical principles are also characterized as ‘constitutive’), while
those carried out in accordance with the relational categories connect
appearances (the dynamical principles are called ‘regulative’). Note that
according to the quoted passage, the connection of appearances in
accordance with the dynamical principles contains a different kind of
necessity than that which their mere composition does. Kant states that
the mathematical principles are ‘unconditionally necessary’ in regard to
possible experience, while the dynamical principles are necessary only
‘under the condition of empirical thinking in an experience’ (B199/A16).
This is because it is formally necessary that every intuition have an
extensive and intensive magnitude, while it is formally contingent
whether the object of an intuition exists or not:15 according to the second
Postulate, for something to exist, it must be ‘connected with the material
conditions of experience (of sensation)’ (B266, my emphasis).16Thus, it is
only formally necessary that if an object exists, it stands in determinate
relations with other existing objects. The dynamical principles concern
a different kind of necessity than the mathematical ones because they
presuppose the formally contingent existence of objects.
Axioms of Intuition and Anticipations of Perception
The Axioms of Intuition govern the synthesis by which an appearance is
taken up into ‘empirical consciousness’, which is alternately referred to as
perception (Wahrnehmung) (B207). The synthesis in accordance with the
Axioms involves the combination of the homogeneous in the manifold of
intuition, where ‘the homogeneous’ refers to the continuum of space and
time in intuition. The Axioms tell us that all intuitions, as regards their
spatiotemporal form, are extensive magnitudes: they are constituted
through the successive addition of one homogeneous unit to another. The
synthesis in accordance with the Axioms thus generates the representa-
tion of a determinate region of space and interval of time (i.e. an extensive
magnitude) in the manifold of intuition.
The Anticipations of Perception are concerned not with the spatio-
temporal in perception, but with what Kant calls ‘the real’ in them – the
degree of the sensation by which the subject is affected. As I said earlier,
sensation is a subjective representation – it is a modiﬁcation of the state of
the subject. Despite the subjective character of sensation, however, the
Anticipations tell us that it can be cognized a priori that every sensation
has a sensory content of a determinate degree (i.e. an intensive magni-
tude) which corresponds to the degree of inﬂuence of the objects of
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perception on sense. An absence of ‘the real’ in sensation would, thus,
amount to the absence of all perception.
Together, the syntheses carried out in accordance with the ﬁrst two
principles – the synthesis of the form of the intuition and the synthesis of
the ‘real’ in the intuition – yield perception: the ﬁrst takes up empirical
intuition into ‘empirical consciousness’ (i.e. into apprehension) by
generating the representations of a determinate extensive magnitude, and
the second ‘anticipates’ all perception as having an intensive magnitude
corresponding to ‘the real’ in the object of perception. I will refer jointly
to these two syntheses as the ‘synthesis of apprehension’, and understand
perception to be apprehended empirical intuition.
Analogies of Experience
It is only in the Analogies of Experience that Kant starts speaking of
experience (Erfahrung) in the System of Principles, and he repeatedly
distinguishes it from perception, the subject of the previous two
principles: he deﬁnes experience as the ‘representation of a necessary
connection of perceptions’; as ‘empirical cognition, i.e. a cognition that
determines an object through perceptions’ (B218); and, ﬁnally, as ‘the
synthetic unity of perceptions’ (A183/B226). He goes on to characterize
the Analogies as rules ‘in accordance with which unity of experience is
to arise from perceptions’ (A180/B223).
The Analogies, thus, represent the conditions that are necessary for
perception (apprehended intuition) to yield experience. They are
‘regulative’ of intuition but ‘constitutive’ of experience (A664/B692). As
was previously stated, Kant characterizes the dynamical principles as
dealing with the existence and relations of objects (A178/B221). Recall
from earlier that, according to the second Postulate, an object exists if it
‘is connected with the material conditions of experience (of sensation)’
(B266). Roughly, then, for an object to exist, it has to be connected to
a sensory state. Kant makes it clear that this connection does not have
to be immediate: an object exists so long as it is connected to the object of
some sensory state in accordance with the Analogies (A225). Thus,
insofar as their existence is concerned, all objects of experience stand in
determinate dynamical relations to one another.
Kant says that the Analogies are ‘rules of general time-determination’
(B220). Accordingly, the Analogies present the rules in accordance
with which all existing appearances (‘objects of experience’) stand
in determinate time relations. The ﬁrst Analogy states that substance
kant on perception, experience and judgements thereof
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(the persisting, underlying matter of all appearance) is the precondition of
all temporal relations between objects of experience. The second Analogy
states that all ‘alteration’ (i.e. the succession of one state by another in the
same object) in objects of experience happens in accordance with the law
of the connection of cause and effect, where the cause is a sufﬁcient
condition for the bringing about of the effect. The third Analogy, lastly,
states that all objects of experience, insofar as they coexist in space, are
in thoroughgoing causal interaction (immediately or mediately).
Kant says that experience, in contrast to perception, represents the
‘relation in the existence of the manifold… not as it is juxtaposed in time
but as it is objectively in time’ (B219). Given that apprehension is always
successive while appearances can coexist, there is a difference between
the ‘subjective’ time of inner sense in which we apprehend intuitions and
the ‘objective’ time in which objects of experience exist and interact
with one another (cf. Watkins 2005: 189). The various states of an
apprehended object might coexist, as do for example the different parts of
a house, but they are apprehended successively in time. In other words,
perception only presents the succession of states in the subject, not their
priority or simultaneity in the object (B233, B257). Without the a priori
synthesis of perceptions in accordance with the relational categories,
it would not be possible to distinguish between subjective and
objective time.
Thus the temporal relations of perceptions in apprehension do not
necessarily correspond to the objective temporal relations that hold
between actual appearances. This means that the synthesis of apprehen-
sion generates representations that are objective with respect to
their extensive and intensive magnitudes, but subjective with regard to
their temporal relations. We can thus say that perception is a partially
objective representation. For a representation to be fully objective, it
needs to represent the necessary connections that hold between objects of
experience in accordance with the Analogies.17 This representation
would be an empirical cognition, or experience.We can now ﬁne-tune the
preliminary table presented in section 2 (see p. 355).
4. The Prolegomena Distinction
The Prolegomena was written before the publication of the second
edition of the CPR and is meant to offer an overview of that work. Its
main purpose, as expounded in the preamble, is to answer the question:
how is metaphysics possible? This question is tackled in several steps,
each of which roughly corresponds to the Transcendental Aesthetic,
banafsheh beizaei
354 | KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 22 – 3
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415417000127
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 185.46.137.18, on 30 Jun 2019 at 11:35:52, subject to the
Level of Objective
Validity Representation Form Matter Object
Level of
Determination
1 Intuition Space and time Sensation Appearance 1
2 Perception (apprehended
intuition)
Extensive and intensive
magnitudes
Intuition Partially-determinate
appearance
2
3 Experience Dynamical relations* Perception Phenomena 3
*Kant characterizes the relations of inherence, causality and reciprocity holding between the objects of experience as ‘the dynamical
relations from which all others arise’ (B262).
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Transcendental Analytic, Transcendental Dialectic and Doctrine of
Method in the CPR. The second part, whose content roughly overlaps
with that of the Transcendental Analytic, is concerned with the question:
how is pure natural science possible? Later, Kant further clariﬁes the
problem by reformulating the question as: ‘how is it possible in general to
cognize a priori the necessary conformity to law of things as objects of
experience?’ (§17, 4: 296).
The laws in question here are what Kant terms the ‘universal laws of
nature’ (§15, 4: 295), and they are quite different from empirical laws of
nature, in that the latter can never be cognized a priori. The universal laws
of nature, which comprise the content of pure natural science proper, ‘exist
fully a priori’, are purely ‘formal’ and determine the existence of all objects
of experience (§15–16, 4: 295–6). Recall from the previous section that the
Analogies determine the existence and relation of appearances a priori.
Already, then, there is a strong indication that Kant is primarily concerned
with the Analogies in the second part of the Prolegomena. The primacy of
the Analogies will become more evident in the ensuing discussion of the
Prolegomena account of empirical judgements.
Soon after his reformulation of the question at hand, Kant draws the dis-
tinction between judgements of perception and judgements of experience:
[A]lthough all judgements of experience are empirical, i.e., have
their basis in the immediate perception of the senses, nonetheless
the reverse is not the case, that therefore all empirical judgements
are judgements of experience; rather, beyond the empirical and
in general beyond what is given is sensory intuition, special
concepts must be added, which have their origin completely a
priori in the pure understanding, under which every perception
can ﬁrst be subsumed and then, by means of the same concepts
transformed into experience.
Empirical judgements, insofar as they have objective validity, are
judgements of experience; those, however, that are only sub-
jectively valid I call mere judgements of perception. The latter do
not require pure concepts of the understanding, but only the
logical connection of perceptions in a thinking subject. But the
former always demand, beyond the representations of sensory
intuition, in addition special concepts originally generated in the
understanding, which are precisely what make the judgements of
experience objectively valid. (§18, 4: 297–8)
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Judgements of perception are subjectively valid – that is to say, ‘they hold
good only for us, i.e., for our subject’ (§18, 4: 298), while judgements of
experience have objective validity, which, Kant says, is equivalent to
‘necessary universal validity’, i.e., holding for everyone (§19, 4: 298). The
main difference between the two types of judgement is that judgements of
perception do not require pure concepts of understanding but ‘only the
logical connection of concepts’, whereas judgements of experience
require ‘special concepts originally generated in the understanding’. The
objective validity of judgements of experience is due to the latter’s use of
these special concepts of the understanding. All (empirical) judgements,
Kant writes, are ‘at ﬁrst’ mere judgements of perception, and ‘only
afterwards do we give them a new relation, namely to an object, and
intend that the judgement should also be valid at all times for us and for
everyone else’ (§18, 4: 298).18
I hope to show that a close reading of the Prolegomena makes it
abundantly clear that the ‘special concepts’ that make objectively valid
judgements of experience possible are those belonging to the category of
relation (subsistence, causality, community).19 This would mean that
the sense in which judgements of perception are subjective concerns the
relation they posit between appearances. The necessity expressed in
judgements of experience would, accordingly, concern the relation that
holds between appearances in accordance with the Analogies.
The Prolegomena Examples
The ﬁrst examples Kant provides for judgements of perception are ‘the
room is warm, the sugar sweet, the wormwood repugnant’. These
judgements ‘express only a relation of two sensations to the same subject,
namely myself, and this only in my present state of perception, and are
therefore not expected to be valid for the object’ (§19, 4: 299). The
judgements in this set of examples can never become judgements of
experience ‘because they refer to mere feeling – which everyone
acknowledges to be merely subjective and which must therefore never
be attributed to the object’ (§19n., 4: 299).
Kant’s second and third examples of judgements of perception are ones
that can become judgements of experience. Curiously, the two types of
judgement in the second example are identical in their formulation: Kant
says that in making the judgement ‘The air is elastic’, one could either
mean it as a judgement of perception, in which case only two perceptions
(in the subject) are related to one another; or one could mean it as
a judgement of experience, in which case one requires that the relation of
kant on perception, experience and judgements thereof
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the perceptions ‘be subject to a condition that makes it universally valid’
(§19, 4: 299).20 In the third example, Kant contrasts the mere judgement
of perception ‘If the sun shines on the stone, it becomes warm’ with the
judgement of experience ‘The sun warms the stone’. In the latter for-
mulation, ‘beyond the perception is added the understanding’s concept of
cause, which connects necessarily the concept of sunshine with that of
heat’ (§20n., 4: 301).
Kant characterizes the process through which the judgement of percep-
tion ‘The air is elastic’ is converted into a judgement of experience as
follows:
Now before a judgement of experience can arise from a judge-
ment of perception, it is ﬁrst required: that the perception be
subsumed under a concept of the understanding of this kind;
e.g., the air belongs under the concept of cause, which deter-
mines the judgement about the air as hypothetical with respect to
expansion. This expansion is represented not as belonging
merely to my perception of the air in my state of perception or in
several of my states or in the states of others, but as necessarily
belonging to it, and the judgement: the air is elastic, becomes
universally valid and thereby for the ﬁrst time a judgement of
experience, because certain judgements occur beforehand, which
subsume the intuition of the air under the concept of cause and
effect, and thereby determine the perceptions not merely with
respect to each other in my subject, but with respect to the form
of judging in general (here, the hypothetical), and in this way
make the empirical judgement universally valid. (§19, 4: 300–1)
Kant writes that before a judgement of experience can arise from a
judgement of perception, ‘certain judgements must occur’. These
judgements ‘subsume the intuition of the air under the concept of cause
and effect’ and thus ‘determine the perceptions … with respect to the
form of judging in general’. To subsume representations under the
categories is thus to determine them with regard to the logical forms
of judgement. This means that for a combination of concepts to be
indeterminate with regard to the logical forms of judgement is for it to be
indeterminate with regard to one of the categories.21 In the judgement of
perception ‘The air is elastic’, the representation of air is indeterminate
with regard to the relational categories: we know this because Kant says it
has to be subsumed under the concept of cause and effect in order to
be determined with regard to the hypothetical form of judgement.
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The following is a reconstruction of the process described in the passage
above, through which judgements of perception turn into judgements
of experience.
We start with:
(1) Judgement of perception: The air is elastic.
Which, in view of a nominal deﬁnition of elasticity as ‘expanding after
compression’, can be turned into:
(2) Judgement of perception: After air is compressed, it then
expands (i.e. returns to its original volume).
The ‘condition’ of the judgement of perception (here, compression) is
subsumed under the concept of cause.22 This gives us:
(3) Judgement of experience: If air is compressed (cause), it
expands (effect).
Which can be turned into:
(4) Judgement of experience: The air is elastic.
I do not imagine Kant is suggesting that, in making a judgement of
experience, we explicitly go through steps (1) to (4). The process outlined
above seems, rather, to be what would paradigmatically be involved
in making judgements of experience. While the intricacies of just
what is involved in ‘subsumption’ under the category of relation are
controversial and not the focus of this paper, Kant is in any case explicit
here that the process would involve making ‘certain judgements’.23
Thus it is subsumption under pure concepts (speciﬁcally, under those
concepts belonging to the category of relation – more on this in the next
section), and not the mere logical form of judgement, that gives us licence
to characterize the connection of appearances in necessary and universal
terms.24Given that the logical forms of judgement belong to pure general
logic and the categories to transcendental logic, this should not come as a
surprise. In the CPR, pure general logic is described as ‘abstracting from
all empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised’,
and dealing with ‘the mere form of thinking’ (A53/B77–A54/B78).
In contrast, transcendental logic is concerned with ‘the origin of our
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cognitions of objects insofar as that cannot be ascribed to the objects’
(B80/A56), i.e. ‘with the part of our thought that has its origin solely in
the understanding’; it supplies ‘the principles without which no object
can be thought at all’ (A62/B87). Therefore, the logical forms of judge-
ment, on their own, are not sufﬁcient for ‘introducing’ a transcendental
content into representations, that is, for determining them with respect to
the categories.25
‘Special Concepts’
As we saw, judgements of experience require ‘special concepts’ of
the understanding. Now, as I argued in section 3, perceptions
(i.e. apprehended intuitions) are indeterminate with respect to the
category of relation. Likewise, the judgements of perception Kant lists in
the second and third examples of the Prolegomena were shown to be
indeterminate with regard to the relational categories. Clearly, then, the
‘special concepts’ required for making judgements of experience are those
belonging to the category of relation. As we progress in the second part of
the Prolegomena, it only becomes more evident that Kant takes all and
only judgements of experience to utilize the concepts belonging to the
category of relation.26 The Analogies, we saw in the previous section,
make it possible for experience to arise from perception. They are,
accordingly, what makes it possible for judgements of perception to give
rise to judgements of experience. In his account of the Analogies in the
Prolegomena Kant writes:
With respect to the relation of appearances, and indeed exclusive
with regard to their existence, the determination of this relation
is not mathematical but dynamical, and it can never be objec-
tively valid, hence ﬁt for experience, if it is not subject to a priori
principles, which ﬁrst make the cognition of experience possible
with respect to that determination. Therefore, appearances must
be subsumed under the concept of substance, which, as a concept
of the thing itself, underlies all determination of existence; or
second, insofar as a temporal sequence, i.e., an event is met
with among the appearances, they must be subsumed under
the concept of an effect in relation to a cause; or, insofar
as coexistence is to be cognized objectively, i.e., through a
judgement of experience, they must be subsumed under the
concept of community (interaction): and so a priori principles
underlie objectively valid, though empirical judgements, i.e.,
they underlie the possibility of experience insofar as it is
supposed to connect objects in nature according to existence.
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These principles are the actual laws of nature, which can be
called dynamical. (§25, 4: 307)
The passage quoted makes it clear that the determination of the
existence of appearances is objectively valid only if it is ‘subject to a priori
principles’, that is to say, subject to the Analogies (since these are the
principles that deal with the existence and relation of appearances). All
judgements of experience thus involve the subsumption of perceptions
under concepts belonging to the category of relation. The Analogies are
described as ‘the actual laws of nature’, and, given the description of
nature as ‘the whole object of all possible experience’ (§17, 4: 297), it is
evident that the Analogies are the rules to which all judgements
of experience conform.27 The empirical laws of nature (for example,
Newton’s universal law of gravitation), insofar as they carry with them
an expression of necessity, are grounded in the Analogies as the universal
a priori laws of nature.28
Corresponding to this account, we can further ﬁne-tune the table
developed in sections 2 and 3 (see p. 362).
Two Kinds of Judgements of Perception
Judgements of perception can legitimately only express the connection
of perceptions, not the connection of the objects of perception. However,
this does not mean that such judgements only ever express what
Prauss (1971) terms ‘subjective-private states’ (as quoted in Longuenesse
1998: 188). While the relation they posit between perceptions depends
on phenomenal consciousness (and is, thus, only subjectively valid), the
perceptions themselves can have objects other than the subject’s own
representations. It is difﬁcult to see how judgements regarding subjective-
private states can ever be conferred with necessity and universality – i.e.
hold for everyone, as judgements of experience do. Nonetheless, Kant
makes it clear that at least some judgements of perception can be trans-
formed into judgements of experience, and that, in fact, all judgements of
experience are initially mere judgements of perception (§18, 4: 298).
I suggest, therefore, that judgements of perception are about partially
determinate appearances, in the sense laid out in section 3: appearances
determined with respect to their quantity and quality, but not with
respect to their relations. Some judgements of perception (e.g. ‘sugar
tastes sweet’) can never be turned into objectively valid judgements of
experience. Others (e.g. ‘if the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm’)
can, if the constituent perceptions are subsumed under the category
of relation.
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Level of
Objective
Validity Representation Form Matter Object
Level of
Determination
1 Intuition Space and time Sensation Appearance 1
2 Perception
(apprehended
intuition)
Extensive and
intensive
magnitudes
Intuition Partially determinate
appearance
2
Judgement of
perception
Relation of concepts* Perception analysed
into concepts**
3 Experience Dynamical relations Perception Phenomena (fully
determinate
appearance)
3
Judgement of
experience
Relation of concepts Experience analysed
into concepts
*The relation of subject to predicate, ground to consequence, or part to whole, corresponding to the categorical, hypothetical, and
disjunctive forms of judgement. Cf. A266/B322: ‘In every judgement one can call the given concepts logical matter (for judgement),
their relation (by means of the copula) the form of the judgement.’While the form of both judgements of perception and judgements of
experience is the relation of concepts, only the latter are determinate with respect to the category of relation.**I am following
Longuenesse’s account of concept formation, according to which empirical concepts are generated through analysing synthesized
representations through processes of reﬂection, comparison and abstraction (1998: ch. 6).
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Kant’s ﬁrst set of examples can be said to be judgements of feeling.
While Kant does not elaborate any further on feeling (Gefühl) in the
Prolegomena, select passages in the CPR provide helpful remarks. In
the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant characterizes feeling as ‘an effect of
the sensation’, and ‘pleasant taste’ as grounded in feeling (A29). He
further characterizes ‘colors, sounds, and warmth’ as ‘merely sensations
and not intuitions’, and thus not ‘allow[ing] any object to be cognized,
least of all a priori’ (B44/A28).29 These accounts are roughly in keeping
with the ﬁrst set of Prolegomena examples, which describe, respectively,
warmth, taste and displeasure. These cannot ever become judgements of
experience – i.e. they will only ever express the subject’s present state. As
Longuenesse puts it, they ‘attribute[e] to the object a predicate that really
expresses a mere feeling’ (1998: 173, note 13).
The second group of judgements of perception – those that can become
judgements of experience – are more than mere judgements of feeling.
I suggest they can be characterized as either (i) singular judgements;30 or
(ii) inductive generalizations.31
A singular judgement of perception is valid only for the subject and at the
time of its utterance, since any lasting and inter-subjective validity
would presuppose at least a permanently persisting substratum in
which properties can inhere (and potentially the concepts of causality or
community, if the judgement posits a necessary temporal sequence
or coexistence). As was previously argued, just because a certain repre-
sentation assumes the position of subject in a judgement does not mean
that its object is thought of as determined with respect to the pure concept
of substance: I can say ‘The air is elastic’ without having subsumed air
under the pure concept of substance. In such a case, the judgement,
though categorical, is not determinate with regard to the category of
relation, which means the relation it posits is not objectively valid.
An inductive generalization would lay claim to what Kant characterizes
in the CPR as ‘assumed or comparative universality’, which only licenses
one to say ‘so far as we have observed until now, no exception has been
found to this or that rule’. An objectively valid judgement of experience,
however, lays claim to what Kant characterizes as ‘strict universality’,
such that ‘no exception at all is allowed to be possible’ (B3–5). Strict
universality can never be derived empirically, which only ever supplies
the grounds for comparative universality. Judgements of perception that
express inductive generalizations thus can only lay claim to comparative
universality, which lacks the a priori grounding that allows for
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strict universality. Ultimately, the relation such judgements posit is not
objectively valid either.
5. The Problem of the B Deduction
In §19 in the B Deduction, Kant characterizes judgement as ‘nothing
other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of
apperception’ (B141). The logical form of judgement is thus identiﬁed
with the form of the objective unity of apperception (OUA), that is, a
consciousness that is able to relate to objects. Longuenesse observes that
the form of judgement ‘do[es] not relate my states to myself, but marks to
objects’. The form of judgement thus carries with it the ‘norm’ to be
objectively valid – that is to say, capable of being true for everyone
(1998: 186).
This might seem to imply that a judgement of perception is a contra-
diction in terms: Kant does, after all, emphasize that such judgements are
only subjectively valid. The account of judgement in the B Deduction has
led some commentators, foremost among them Allison, to argue that the
Prolegomena distinction is abandoned in the second edition of the CPR
in favour of the distinction between associations of the imagination,
which are subjectively valid, and judgements, which are objectively valid
(Allison 1983: 148–53). Here is what Kant has to say about the former in
the B Deduction:
In accordance with [laws of association] I could only say ‘When
I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight,’ but not ‘It, the body, is
heavy,’which would be to say that these two representations are
combined in the object, i.e., regardless of any difference in the
condition of the subject, and are not merely found together
in perception (however often as that might be repeated).
(§19, B142)
The laws of association are a function of the imagination, and they ensure
that ‘empirical ideas that have frequently followed one another produce
a habit in the mind such that when one idea is produced, the other also
comes into being’ (Anth, 7: 176). This is, of course, reminiscent of
Hume’s characterization of custom or habit as the basis of our belief
in causal connections (1993: 28). In fact, Kant mentions the laws of
association in connection with Hume in his preface to the Prolegomena.
Here he observes that for Hume the notion of a necessary connection
between cause and effect is ‘really nothing but a bastard of the imagina-
tion, which, impregnated by experience, and having brought certain
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representations under the law of association, passes off the resulting
subjective necessity (i.e., habit) for an objective necessity (from insight)’
(4: 258).
In the revised and enlarged second edition of Kant’s Transcendental
Idealism, Allison alters his position with regard to judgements of
perception, arguing that there is no doctrinal change in Kant’s account of
judgement between the publications of the Prolegomena and the B
edition of theCPR. Following Cassirer, he attributes a didactic role to the
notion of judgements of perception, claiming Kant devised it simply in
order to expose the shortcomings of the ‘standard empiricist’, that is,
Humean, account of empirical judgement (cf. Cassirer 1953: 245–6).
Allison goes on to argue, however, that the role of judgements of
perception in the Prolegomena is not solely didactic, as Kant explicitly
characterizes such judgements as ‘the ﬁrst stage in a cognitive process’.
The seeming incompatibility between the B Deduction account of
judgement and the Prolegomena distinction is ﬁnally attributed to the
Prolegomena’s ‘particular goal and method’, that is to say, its analytic (as
opposed to synthetic) method, and its function as merely ‘preparatory’
for those wishing to become familiar with the critical system (Allison
2004: 179–82; cf. 2015: 303–4).32
I believe the framework developed in this paper provides an alternative to
both Allison’s original and revised positions, and has the advantage of
neither (i) attributing doctrinal confusion or a change of heart to Kant (as
per Allison’s ﬁrst position), nor (ii) explaining away the apparent tension
between the BDeduction and the Prolegomena by an appeal to pragmatic
considerations on Kant’s part (as per Allison’s revised position).
If we allow, as I have argued, that appearances admit of degrees of
determination, and that the mere form of judgement is not sufﬁcient for
the assertion of a necessary and universal connection between appear-
ances, then we have to allow that there can be judgements that are not
fully objective (i.e. judgements of perception). However, because (as §19
in the B Deduction makes clear) the form of all judgements is the form of
the OUA, judgements of perception, in cases where they are not judge-
ments of feeling, can become judgements of experience: as judgements,
they carry with them the ‘norm’ to achieve full objective validity.
On the other hand, subjective associations of the imagination can never
give rise to universal rules. They are, properly speaking, mere expressions
of the subject’s representational states, and are thus not truth-valued
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(cf. Allison 2004: 88). Of course, it is consistent to argue that judgements
of perception utilize empirical associations, habitually produced by the
imagination, in asserting a connection between appearances (cf. Höffe
1994: 74). In such a case, however, they would not be mere associations
of the imagination: their form would be the form of the OUA, which
carries with it the synthesis of apprehension. Strictly speaking, then, in
the absence of the OUA, mere associations of the imagination would only
be able to express a relation between unprocessed representations.
Unlike what Cassirer and Allison assert, then, it is not judgements of
perception but subjective associations of the imagination that Kant uses
didactically as ‘a methodologically constructed limiting case’, meant to
‘throw light upon the newly gained concept of scientiﬁc objectivity by
force of contrast’ (Cassirer 1953: 245–6). As Longuenesse puts it, the
distinction between subjective associations of imagination and objective
judgements is not a distinction between two types of empirical judgement
(as the Prolegomena distinction is) but between two proposed origins of
empirical judgement (1998: 188). The ﬁrst would be something akin to
the ‘bundle theory’ offered by Hume, wherein there is no uniﬁed subject
of experience, only associated representations. These associations, even if
expressed in the form of judgements, would never have license to posit
strict universality. The second would be Kant’s account of the OUA as
present in the form of all judgements. The OUA drives and makes
possible the progression from judgements of perception into judgements
of experience, which alone admit of strict universality.33
Notes
1 I will follow the practice of citing the ﬁrstCritique by giving the page number for the ﬁrst
edition of 1781 (A) followed by the page number for the second edition of 1787 (B). I will
refer to Kant’s other works by the volume and page number in the Akademie edition
(1902– ). All translations are from the Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel
Kant, edited by P. Guyer and A. Wood (1991–). For convenience, I will use in-text
citation for Kant’s works.
2 Note that my concern in this paper is solely with empirical theoretical cognition.
There are pure concepts of practical cognition (those of morality) and pure concepts
of non-empirical theoretical cognition (those of mathematics) that I am not
considering here.
3 In the Transcendental Aesthetic, pure intuitions (space and time) are characterized as
objectively valid with regard to appearances (B44/A28, A35/B52). In the Transcendental
Analytic, the same is said of the pure concepts of the understanding (A90, B126, A97)
and judgements (B141, B168).
4 I take it that here, as in the taxonomy of the Stufenleiter in the Transcendental Dialectic
in the CPR (A320/B377), Kant is using the term ‘cognition’ more liberally than in the
technical sense laid out in the B Deduction (B147), to mean all representations that are
objective to any degree.
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5 I make this distinction because Kant speaks of determination in a non-transcendental
sense as well. The principle of complete determination, for example, states that all
objects are determinate with regard to every possible predicate (A572/B600). While the
principle itself is supposed to be a priori, the particular predicates that are instantiated in
particular objects are not.
6 Note that the Kantian usage of the terms ‘determinate’ and ‘determinable’ is different
from the contemporary usage coined by W. E. Johnson.
7 In my view, transcendental determinacy is both a metaphysical and epistemological
notion: an object or a relation is determinate to the extent that we can have a priori
knowledge of it. For a helpful discussion of the metaphysical and epistemological import
of the determination of appearances in the CPR, see Watkins (2005: ch. 3).
8 ‘Appearances (Erscheinungen) to the extent that as objects they are thought in
accordance with the unity of the categories are called phenomena (Phaenomena)’
(A249). While Kant tends to use the term Erscheinungen for all appearances in the CPR,
he talks about the distinction between apparentia (the undetermined object of empirical
intuition) and phaenomenon (the object of experience) in his Inaugural Dissertation
(2: 394). For more on this distinction, see Longuenesse (1998: 24-6).
9 Note that I am here ignoring the potential synthesis of raw sensations into spatiotemporal
representations (intuitions), and treating intuitions as the baseline for determinacy, as Kant
often does. Nonetheless, it seems technically correct to me to say that human intuitions are,
in turn, determinate with regard to the forms of our sensibility, space and time.
10 As Karl Ameriks puts it, appearances can be seen as extensionally equivalent to
phenomena, but intensionally different from them. (2003: 78).
11 It should, however, be noted that intuitions, while in Kant’s words ‘undetermined’, are
objective insofar as they have a spatiotemporal form. Indeed, Kant repeatedly
emphasizes that space and time are ‘objectively valid’ with regard to everything that
can come before us (A28/B44, B52).
12 In the third Critique, Kant draws a distinction between ‘objective sensations’, which are
of objects of perception (and thus give rise to empirical judgements), and ‘subjective
sensations’, which are of feelings (and thus give rise to aesthetic judgements). This
distinction does not concern us here, and, in any case, even a so-called objective
sensation is still a subjective representation in that it is not determined by any forms of
experience (CPJ, 5: 206–7).
13 Kant also speaks of intuition as ‘immediate representation’, but I take this to be
primarily meant to distinguish the faculty of intuition in general, by which an object is
immediately given (whether spatiotemporally or otherwise), with the faculty of
understanding, through which an object is mediately (discursively) thought.
14 Strictly speaking, however, the modal categories have a role to play at each level in the
progress to experience, and the relational principles are the truly only ‘dynamical’ ones.
At the outset of his account of the Postulates, Kant observes that it is a peculiar quality of
the modal categories that ‘as determination of the object they do not augment the
concept to which they are ascribed in the least, but rather express only the relation to the
faculty of cognition’ (A219). As such, I will limit my discussion of the dynamical
principles to the Analogies of Experience.
15 I am using ‘formally necessary’ in the sense formulated by Nick Stang (2011: 446),
whereby ‘[i]t is formally necessary that p just in case it is incompatible with our forms of
experience that not-p’.
16 For the most part, Kant uses ‘actuality’ (Wirklichkeit) and ‘existence’ (Dasein)
interchangeably (A145, A225, B273). In fact, when he ﬁrst presents the table of
categories, Kant characterizes the second moment of the category of modality as
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‘Existence – Non-existence’ (A80/B106) and only in his account of the Postulates
characterizes it as ‘actuality’.
17 To say that perceptions are partially determined by the categories is not necessarily to
commit to either a conceptualist or a nonconcepualist reading of Kant. The conceptualist
(cf. Ginsborg 2008 and Grifﬁth 2010) argues that all objective content of representation
(including that of intuitions) requires the mediation of concepts while the nonconceptu-
alist (cf. Allais 2009 and Tolley 2013) argues that empirical intuition can present us with
objective content of particulars independent of the mediation of concepts. To argue that
the objective content of perception (as apprehended intuition) is partially determined by
the categories is not to take a position either way with regard to whether the most
minimal form of this content (i.e. that presented in intuitions) is mediated by concepts or
not. Accordingly, the categorial syntheses spoken of throughout this paper are those on
whose occurrence both conceptualists and nonconceptualists agree: that is, those
involving the subsumption of intuitions under concepts. Thus when, for example, I say
that perception is not guided by the concept of relation, I mean this with regard to the
‘latter end’ of the epistemic process – to borrow Longuenesse’s phrasing (2000: 96). I do
not mean to deny the possibility of a more ‘primitive’ synthesis of the sensible manifold
in accordance with the concept of relation. Thanks to an anonymous referee at this
journal for pressing me to clarify this point.
18 As Kant’s own examples will show, however, not all judgements of perception are
capable of being ‘transformed’ into judgements of experience through the employment
of the ‘special concepts’ of the understanding.
19 Michael Friedman makes the same point in the context of his illuminating study of
Kant’s treatment of Newton’s laws of motion: ‘[T]he analogies constitute the mechanism
for transforming mere appearance into objective experience.’ See Friedman (1994:
184–5). My claim here should not be taken to mean that the mathematical
categories play no part in the making of judgements of experience, as I am only
talking about the conversion of judgements of perception into judgements of experience.
My argument is that this conversion is made possible by the relational categories
alone. Of course, insofar as all judgements of experience begin as judgements of
perception, they rely on (i.e. are made possible by) the mathematical categories
as well.
20 Beatrice Longuenesse observes that in saying ‘The air is elastic’ I may mean, ‘Air feels
resistant to compression’, thereby meaning it as a mere judgement of perception.
See Longuenesse (1998: 174).
21 Cf. Kant’s introduction to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science: ‘through
concepts of the understanding, an object is determined with respect to one or another
function of judgement’ (4: 475).
22 For more on Kant’s account of the condition of hypothetical judgements
see Longuenesse (1998: 101–2).
23 In very rough terms, these judgements can be envisioned as parts of a syllogism, wherein
the category acts as a universal rule, the transcendental schema as the middle term, and
the perception as the particular instance which is to fall under the universal rule through
the mediation of the schema. See Allison (2004: 213).
24 Robert Hanna makes the same point when he states that the syntactic well-formedness
(grammatical correctness) of judgements is a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition for
their objective validity (2010: 229–31). Longuenesse likewise observes, in her discussion
of the Prolegomena examples, that ‘the mere form of [hypothetical] judgement is not
sufﬁcient to insure that the relation [of causality] does hold of the empirical objects “in
themselves”’ (1998: 178).
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25 There are varying views on the relation between the two kinds of logic. The view held by
Cohen and Ueberweg that general logic deals with analytic judgements and
transcendental logic with synthetic judgements has long been rejected, and it is generally
agreed that general logic contains the rules for all use of the understanding (cf. B76).
There are, however, disagreements regarding the scope or domain of transcendental
logic vis-à-vis general logic. While some (cf. Paton 1957; Tonelli 1994) restrict it to
objects of sensibility, others (cf. Rödl 2006; Tolley 2012) argue that its domain is as
expansive as that of general logic. To the extent that this disagreement has a bearing on
my argument, it concerns whether the forms of judgement can be utilized without
subsumption under the categories (speciﬁcally, that of relation). The Prolegomena’s
account of judgements of perception clearly implies that they can. Whether this notion
(i.e. that of a judgement not employing the categories, speciﬁcally, that of relation) is
coherent within the larger framework of the CPR is one of the things the present
paper seeks to address.
26 To reiterate the point made in note 17, here I am not denying the possibility of an earlier
categorical synthesis in the process of cognition, one by which the sensible manifold is
conceptualized (though I am not taking a position onwhether or not such synthesis takes
place). My claim that ‘all and only judgements of experience utilize the relational
categories’ is concerned with the subsumptive use of the categories only.
27 The Analogies, as the ‘actual laws of nature’, carry necessity and universality with them
insofar as they determine the existence and relation of appearances. As Eric Watkins
observes, ‘the notion of necessity involved in the laws of nature is that of determination,
which Kant understands as the positing of a reality or property to the exclusion of its
opposite’ (2014: 482).
28 In the Mrongovius lectures on metaphysics dating to 1782–3, Kant again draws a
distinction between judgements of perception and judgements of experience, and goes
on to state that for a judgement to have objective validity, the ‘sequence of perceptions
must be determined according to rules, i.e., be necessary’. He identiﬁes this rule with the
principle of sufﬁcient reason, and declares it to be the ground of the possibility of
experience (29: 815). In the System of Principles, likewise, the principle of sufﬁcient
reason is declared to be a synthetic a priori principle, equivalent to the second analogy of
experience, and the ground of possible experience (B246).
29 It should be noted that these sensations, except for pleasure/displeasure, would still be
considered ‘objective’ sensations by the third Critique account (CPJ, 5: 206–7). It seems
to me, however, that the third example from the ﬁrst set (‘wormwood is repugnant’)
could be characterized as an aesthetic judgement instead of an empirical one, since the
feeling it expresses (displeasure) is a subjective sensation.
30 By ‘singular judgement’ I have in mind judgements whose quantity, as per the table of
judgements (A70/B95), is singular (as opposed to particular or universal). That is,
judgements of the form ‘This x is F.’
31 Both Friedman and Longuenesse characterize the second group of judgements of
perception as inductive generalizations. Friedman argues that, for Kant, Kepler’s laws
would have counted as judgements of perception, since they are not grounded in a priori
laws of nature (i.e. the Analogies). As such, they only have a hypothetical or inductive
status, in contradistinction to Newton’s law of universal gravitation, which admits of a
‘material’ universality and necessity (1994: 175–83). Longuenesse, likewise, observes
that the universality expressed by the second group of judgements of perception is ‘mere
inductive generality’ (1998: 172 note 11). In making these judgements, ‘I may suspend at
least provisionally any claim to objective validity … and just state how things seem to
me’ (1998: 174).
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32 For Kant’s exposition of the method and goal of the Prolegomena see 4: 263 and 4: 274,
respectively.
33 Longuenesse goes on to argue that in the ﬁrst case (i.e. the Humean picture) all
judgements would be like judgements of perception (1998: 188). I would add a
qualiﬁcation: whether Humean judgements are equivalent to Kantian judgements of
perception would depend on whether they rely on the synthesis of apprehension, which
has been shown to be an essential part of Kantian judgements of perception. In the
absence of the synthesis of apprehension, judgements formed in accordance with
empirical associations would at most be able to connect simple, unprocessed sense data.
Given that Hume leaves room for complex ideas and impressions, his account seems to
implicitly presuppose some synthesis of apprehension whereby complex representations
are uniﬁed. It could, in the end, turn out that Humean judgements are equivalent to
Kantian judgements of perception, but only if we allow that Hume’s account implicitly
relies on some sort of synthesis.
I am grateful to Nick Stang for helpful discussions and invaluable comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. I also thank two anonymous referees for this journal for their
detailed feedback.
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